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The Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) initially insured private pension benelits in 
exchange for a premium that was not risk sensitive. This paper derives conditions under which a 
moral hazard problem caused promised pension benefits to increase. The hypotheses are tested 
using data on individual pension contracts from the pre- and post-PBGC periods. 
1. Introduction 
In 1974 the U.S. Government established the Pension Benefit Guarantee 
Corporation (PBGC) to insure private pension benefits.’ Since that time, 
numerous proposals have appeared recommending that the PBGC’s flat fee 
schedule be changed to reflect the risk of participants.’ Arguments against 
the flat fee schedule center on issues of moral hazard, adverse selection, and 
cross subsidization. This paper discusses these issues with a special emphasis 
on whether moral hazard caused a shift in employees’ compensation toward 
higher promised pension benelits.3 
Congress introduced several regulatory restrictions on the management of 
pension plans along with the PBGC insurance program. An important issue, 
addressed in this paper, is whether these regulations are sufficient to 
eliminate the moral hazard problems caused by the flat fee schedule. 
Evidence on this issue may be relevant to other government insurance 
programs. For example, Buser, Chen and Kane (1981) and Flannery ( 1982) 
explicitly discuss the role of regulation in mitigating moral hazard problems 
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Bradley, Harry DeAngelo, Jim Little, Bill Marshall, Jay Ritter, Ted Snyder, Laura Starks and 
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‘The PBGC was established by the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security . - 
Act (ERISA). 
‘The 1988 budget changed the premium schedule to more closely reflect the risk of 
participants. 
‘For a general discussion of moral hazard, see Stiglitz (1983). 
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with FDIC insurance.4 Other examples of government insurance programs 
that are likely to introduce moral hazard include government loan guaran- 
tees [see Chaney and Thakor (1985)] and subsidized flood insurance [see 
Kunreuther (1978)]. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, a brief description of 
the structure and regulation of private pensions is presented. In section 3, the 
effect of the flat fee schedule on the behavior of sponsors of defined benefit 
plans is analyzed. The empirical results are presented in section 4. A 
discussion of the results is contained in section 5 and a short summary 
concludes the paper. 
2. Description of the pension system 
This paper is concerned solely with corporate sponsored defined benefit 
plans.5 Prior to the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (ERISA), corporate pension liabilities were not necessarily 
backed by the sponsoring firm’s assets. If a sponsor terminated an- under- 
funded plan, employees did not receive their entire promised benefit. Instead, 
they received only the benefits that could be paid from the pension fund. 
Although underfunded pension plan terminations usually occurred while a 
firm was reorganizing via bankruptcy, merger, spinoff, etcetera, a firm had 
the legal right to terminate an underfunded plan at any time.6 
ERISA significantly changed the payoffs from underfunded pension plans.’ 
Sponsors are now liable for up to thirty percent of their net worth if 
an underfunded plan is terminated. Thus, ERISA forces firms to back 
pension liabilities with a portion of their non-pension assets. ERISA also 
established the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) to insure 
pension benefits. Initially, the PBGC charged the sponsors of all defined 
benefit plans the same annual fee of $1.00 per employee.* If a plan is 
terminated and the pension assets plus thirty percent of the sponsor’s net 
worth is insufficient to pay all the promised pension benefits, then the PBGC 
will pay the benefits up to a maximum amount. Initially, the ceiling on 
?See Goodman and Santomero (1986) and Ricart and Greenbaum (1984) for arguments 
against variable rate premiums for deposit insurance. 
‘Pension plans are of two basic types: defined benefit and defined contribution plans. Under a 
defmed benefit plan, employees are promised a specilic benefit when they retire. The promised 
pension benefit usually depends on the salary and the service of the employee. Under a defined 
contribution plan, the employer contributes a set amount of money to a fund on behalf of each 
employee. The employee receives the accumulated value of the fund at retirement. 
‘See the Legislative History of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: Public 
Law 93-406 for reports on underfunded pension plan terminations prior to 1974. 
‘See Bulow, Scholes and Menell (l981), lppolito (1986) and Logue (1979). 
‘The fee was increased in 1978 to S2.60 and in 1987 to $8.50 per employee. In 1988, the per 
employee fee was increased to $16 plus $6 for every $1,000 that vested benefits exceed pension 
assets per employee. However, the maximum fee is limited to $50. 
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guaranteed benefits was $750 per month for each employee.’ In addition, 
the PBGC phases in the guarantee of benefit increases over a live year 
period. ERISA also restricts how a sponsor must fund its pension plan and 
allocate pension assets. The funding restrictions limit the extent to which a 
plan can become underfunded, and the asset allocation restrictions limit the 
risk of pension assets. 
3. Analysis of the flat fee 
Consider a firm with one employee prior to the introduction of the PBGC 
insurance. Suppose the employee is hired at the beginning of a period and 
retires at the end of the period. Let $B be the pension benefit that the firm 
promises to pay the employee at the end of the period. Let $A be the firm’s 
contribution to the pension fund. This contribution is invested in a portfolio 
of assets and $A, is the random end-of-period value of the pension assets. 
Now suppose the PBGC insurance is introduced, but that the firm does 
not change its compensation package, nor its financial management of the 
pension fund. In subsequent sections, the way in which the firm optimally 
adjusts to the PBGC’s provisions is examined. If A, exceeds the promised 
benefit, B, then the benefit is paid and the sponsor receives the excess 
assets.” If the pension assets are insufficient to pay the promised benefit, 
then the employee has claim to part of the sponsor’s net worth. If thirty 
percent of the sponsor’s net worth is not sufficient to pay the promised 
benefit, then the PBGC pays up to a maximum amount, G. Table 1 lists the 
payoffs to all the parties involved. 
Modeling the payoffs in this way implies that the insurance sold by the 
PBGC is equivalent to a put option. The underlying asset of the option is 
the value of the pension fund’s assets plus thirty percent of the net worth of 
the firm. The exercise price of the option depends on whether the level of 
promised benefits is greater or less than the level of guaranteed benefits. If 
promised benefits are less than guaranteed benefits, then the exercise price is 
the level of promised benefits. Otherwise, the exercise price is the level of 
guaranteed benefits. In exchange for the option, the sponsor pays the PBGC 
an annual fee of S f per employee (initially, f equalled $1.00). 
3.1. Adverse selection and cross subsidization 
The introduction of the PBGC insurance increases the firm’s cost of labor 
by the difference between the fee and the value of the put option: (f-Put). 
As discussed above, the underlying asset of the put option is the pension 
9The ceiling increases each year to reflect increases in the social security wage base. 
“There is some debate over who owns excess pension assets. See Bulow and Scholes (1983). 
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Table 1 
End of period payoffs.” 
Payoff Payoff Payoff 
States to sponsor to employee by PBGC 
A,>B NW,+A,-B B 0 
A,<B 
& NW,+A,-B 
0.3NW+A,>B B 0 
A,<B 
& 





0.3NW+A,<B 0.7N W, G (0.3NW,+A,)-G 
& 
R>G 
‘At =end of period value of pension assets. 
B =promised pension benefit. 
NW = net worth of the sponsor. 
G =maximum benefits guaranteed by the PBGC. 
assets plus thirty percent of the firm’s net worth, A-tO.3NK and the exercise 
price is min(B,G). If f>Put, then the PBGC insurance is equivalent to a tax 
on labor; otherwise, the insurance subsidizes the use of labor. 
If the PBGC insurance program were voluntary, then a severe adverse 
selection problem would exist. Plans for which the value of the put option is 
less than the flat fee would not buy the insurance, leaving only the high risk 
plans in the program. As a result, the revenue received by the PBGC would 
be less than its expected losses. The PBGC insurance is mandatory, however, 
for all defined benefit plans. The mandatory nature of the program mitigates, 
but does not eliminate, adverse selection. A firm can select out of the 
program by terminating its defined benefit plan. A defined contribution plan 
or no plan at all could replace the defined benefit plan. l1 
3.2. Moral hazard 
As discussed earlier, the introduction of the PBGC gives the firm a put 
tt However, Tepper (1981) and Black (1980) show that tax benefits can be obtained from 
defined benefit (DB) plans that are not available to detined contribution (DC) plans. DB and 
DC plans also differ in their incentive effects and risk sharing [see Bodie, Marcus and Merton 
(198.5). Kotlikoff and Wise (1984), and Lazear (1984)]. Finally, there are transaction costs 
associated with switching from a DB plan to a DC plan. 
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option (the insurance) in exchange for a fee of $1: The difference between the 
insurance fee and the value of the insurance represents a subsidy or tax to 
the firm. In particular, the PBGC insurance reduces the firm’s cost of labor 
Put[A+0.3NW,min(G,B)]-f, 
where the first argument in Put [ , ] is the value of the underlying asset and 
the second argument is the exercise price of the option. Assume the Put 
option can be valued as if it and the underlying asset were trading in a 
perfect market. This subsidy or tax, however, is not exogenous. Its value is 
affected by any of the firm’s actions which alters the nature of the underlying 
asset or the exercise price of the put option. Sharpe (1976), Harrison and 
Sharpe (1983), and others examine the firm’s incentive to alter its pension 
funding and pension asset allocation decisions. This paper concentrates on 
whether moral hazard exists with respect to the level of promised pension 
benefits, $B. 
To incorporate ERISA’s funding restrictions into the analysis, assume the 
sponsor’s pension contribution, A, is proportional to B, with the propor- 
tionality factor fixed by funding regulations. l* Thus, the greater the level of 
promised benefits, the more the firm is required to contribute to the pension 
fund. In terms of the put option, the funding requirement implies that the 
initial value of the underlying asset depends on the level of promised benefits. 
Consider first the case when promised benefits, B, exceed guaranteed 
benefits, G. In this case, an increase in promised benefits does not increase 
the PBGC’s potential liability. However, because of funding restrictions, an 
increase in promised benefits increases the value of the assets backing the 
pension claims. In terms of the put option, the value of the underlying asset 
increases, but the exercise price remains constant. Thus, an increase in 
promised benefits decreases the value of the pension put which implies that 
the PBGC subsidy is reduced (or tax is increased). Consequently, moral 
hazard with respect to promised benefits does not arise when the pre-PBGC 
benefit is greater than the ceiling on guaranteed benefits.13 
Now consider the case when promised benefits are less than guaranteed 
tZThe actual funding restrictions state that a sponsor must fund the ‘normal costs’ of the plan 
and that ‘unfunded past service liabilities’ arising from plan amendments can be amortized over 
a thirty year period. The model imposes the restriction that both benefit accruals and benelits 
arising from plan amendments are subject to the same funding requirements. Thus, the funding 
assumption is actually more restrictive than what is allowed in practice. 
t3Moral hazard would arise, however, on other dimensions. For example, moral hazard with 
respect to the riskiness of pension assets would arise, because a firm would not bear the entire 
marginal cost of its decision to increase the risk of pension assets. Instead, part of this marginal 
cost would be borne by the PBGC. 
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benefits. An increase in promised benefits increases the put option’s exercise 
price and the value of the underlying asset. If the exercise price and the 
underlying asset increased by the same proportion, then the value of the put 
option would also increase proportionally. [See Merton (1974)]. When 
promised benefits increase, however, the proportional increase in the exercise 
price is at least as great as the proportional increase in the value of the 
underlying asset. Consequently, the value of the put option increases as 
promised benefits increase.i4 
Since the value of the put option increases, but the fee for the insurance 
does not increase, a firm can substitute promised benefits for other forms of 
compensation and decrease its cost of labor. Intuitively, in some states of the 
world the firm will not pay the additional promised benefits, yet it does not 
have to compensate the employee nor the PBGC for this additional risk. In 
summary, the PBGC insurance increases the marginal benefits of pension 
compensation when promised benefits are less than guaranteed benefits. 
The incentive to increase promised pension compensation exists even for 
firms that are being taxed by the PBGC’s fee schedule, because increasing the 
value of the put option reduces the tax. Thus, moral hazard affects both a 
firm for which the PBGC’s insurance premium is greater than the value of 
the insurance and a firm for which the premium is less than the value of the 
insurance. 
The magnitude of the moral hazard problem depends on the characteris- 
tics of the firm and its pension plan. For example, if the pension plan is 
considerably overfunded, then the pension put is out-of-the-money. Conse- 
quently, a change in promised benefits will have little effect on the put’s 
value. This observation implies that, ceteris paribus, the moral hazard 
problem is related to the funding status of the pension fund. The more 
underfunded is the pension plan, the greater is the incentive to increase 
promised pension benefits. 
Note that this analysis incorporates several restrictions imposed by ERISA 
that mitigate the moral hazard problem. In particular, the deductible equal 
to thirty percent of a firm’s net worth, the ceiling on guaranteed benefits, and 
the funding restrictions all help mitigate the moral hazard problem. ERISA 
also imposed regulations that are not explicitly incorporated into the model. 
For example, the PBGC’s guarantee of additional promised benefits is 
phased in over a five year period. In addition, ERISA gave the PBGC the 
right to terminate a pension plan before the PBGC becomes liable for 
underfunded benefits. The next section examines empirically whether, despite 
these restrictions, the moral hazard problem has altered the structure of 
employee compensation. 
14A formal proof is available from the author. 
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4. Empirical tests 
4.1. Data 
The empirical tests compare post-PBGC levels of promised benefits to pre- 
PBGC levels for individual pension plans. The 1970 and 19761978 Editions 
and supplements of the Digest of Selected Pension Plans, published by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, provide pension contract information for the pre- 
and post-PBGC periods. These data include benefit accrual formulae for 165 
pension plans for the pre-PBGC period and 172 plans for the post-PBGC 
period. Both pre- and post-PBGC data are available for 129 plans. 
Pension contracts specify promised pension benefits using a benefit 
formula. Two types of benefit formulae dominate the sample. A wage-based 
benefit formula specifies the monthly pension benefit as a percentage of 
wages. The percentage may be constant or it may depend on years of service 
with the employer. The relevant wage figure may be terminal earnings or an 
average of earnings over a specified time period. A service-based benefit 
formula specifies the monthly pension benefit as a dollar amount times years 
of service. For example, monthly benefits may equal ten dollars per year of 
service. 
To control for inflation and changes in productivity over the sample 
period, the data are adjusted for changes in wage rates. If the pension benefit 
is specified in terms of a nominal dollar amount, the post-PBGC promised 
pension benefit is discounted by one plus the percentage change in the wage 
rate over the sample period. I5 Because formulae that specify benefits as a 
percentage of wages are implicitly indexed to pre-retirement inflation and 
productivity changes, these formulae do not require adjustment. 
For benefit formulae based on wages, the parameter of interest is the 
percentage that is applied to wages. For example, the pension plan for the 
tobacco workers at American Brands had the following pre-PBGC and post- 
PBGC monthly benefit formulae: 
pre-PBGC: Benetit = 0.01 *wages*years of service, 
post-PBGC: Benefit =O.O125*wages*years of service. 
Thus, the parameters of interest are 0.01 and 0.0125. In this case, the benefits 
are recorded as having increased by 25%. 
For benefit formulae based on service, the parameter of interest is the 
promised monthly benefit per year of service. For example, the meat cutters 
at Armour Company had the following monthly benefit formulae: 
15The wage index is for hourly compensation of persons in manufacturing. These data are 
published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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pre-PBGC: Benefit = $5.OO*years of service, 
post-PBGC: Benefit = $8.50*years of service. 
The parameters of interest are $5.00 and $8.50. Industrial wages increased 
60% from the time the pre-PBGC formula was recorded to the time the post- 
PBGC formula was recorded. Therefore, the $8.50 figure is discounted by 
1.60, yielding a figure of $5.31. In this case, benefits are recorded as having 
increased by 6.2%. 
The change in promised benefits could not objectively be determined in 
twenty of the 120 plans. For example, some firms changed from a service 
based benefit formula to an earnings based formula. Therefore, a comparison 
of the generosity of the two formulae requires assumptions about wage levels 
and years of service. Consequently, these twenty plans are eliminated from 
the sample.16 
The pension plans are of three general types: single-employer plans that 
are collectively bargained, single-employer plans that are not collectively 
bargained, and multi-employer plans that are collectively bargained. The 
characteristics of collectively bargained plans are the result of negotiations 
between management and professional unions. A single-employer plan has 
only one sponsor. McDonnell-Douglas Corporation’s plan for its machinists 
is an example of a collectively bargained single-employer plan. McDonnell- 
Douglas Corporation’s plan for salaried employees is an example of a non- 
collectively bargained single-employer plan. In contrast, a multi-employer 
plan has several sponsors. An example of a multi-employer plan is the 
pension plan for union carpenters in New York City, which has several 
contractors as sponsors. 
4.2. Hypotheses and results 
The analysis in section 3 predicts that promised benefits increased 
following the introduction of the PBGC insurance in 1974 if the additional 
benefits would have been covered by the insurance. There are two reasons 
why additional benefits would not have been covered by the insurance. First, 
the PBGC did not insure multi-employer plans until 1980. Second, even if 
the plan was covered by the insurance, if the pre-PBGC benefit level 
exceeded the guaranteed level, then additional benefits were not guaranteed. 
Thus, the data are divided into groups depending on whether additional 
benefits would have been covered by the PBGC insurance. 
16The changes in the type of benefit formulae showed no obvious pattern. 
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4.2.1. PBGC insurance coverage 
Multi-employer plans were not covered by the PBGC insurance until 1980. 
Since the post-PBGC benefit formulae are from contracts written prior to 
1980, multi-employer plans represent a control group. Thus, a comparison of 
multi-employer plans with single-employer plans controls for factors such as 
changes in the generosity of Social Security benefits, changes in effective tax 
rates, or changes in interest rates over the sample period.” 
Among the single employer plans, those plans with promised benefits 
below the guaranteed ceiling need to be distinguished from those with 
promised benefits above the ceiling. The initial ceiling on guaranteed benefits 
was $750 per month and the ceiling increased each year depending on the 
Social Security Wage Base. Aggregate data on monthly pension benefits 
suggest that the ceiling was not likely to be binding for most plans. For 
example, in 1984, ten years after the introduction of the PBGC insurance, the 
average monthly pension annuity was only $525 [see Ippolito (1986)]. 
Pre-PBGC benefit levels for the plans in this sample were computed under 
several assumptions for earnings and service. The results of this exercise (not 
reported) indicate that very few (if any) of the single employer plans were 
likely to have had pre-PBGC benefit levels that exceeded the guaranteed 
ceiling. 1 * Thus, it is assumed that for all of the single employer plans, the 
guaranteed ceiling was not binding. 
Consequently, a test of the moral hazard hypothesis involves a comparison 
of benefit changes between single-employer and multi-employer plans. Table 
2 presents the data on this comparison. 
The data are classified into one of three groups: Decrease Group, No 
Change Group, and Increase Group. The name of each group describes the 
change in promised benefits from the pre- to the post-PBGC period. Panel A 
of table 2 illustrates that the distribution of benefit changes differs across the 
two types of plans. Among single employer plans, 49% increased promised 
benefits and only 22% reduced promised benefits. In contrast, 36% of the 
multi-employer plans increased promised benefits and 52% decreased pro- 
mised benefits. A non-parametric chi-squared test rejects at the 0.01 level the 
hypothesis that the changes in promised benefits for single-employer and 
multi-employer plans are drawn from a homogeneous distribution. Thus, the 
data in panel A of table 2 support the moral hazard hypothesis. 
Panel B of table 2 reports summary statistics on the percentage change in 
the benefit formulae for the two types of pension plans. Among the single- 
employer plans, promised benefits increased on average by 7.8%. In contrast, 
the mean percentage change for the multi-employer plans was minus 2.9%. 
“The methodology does not control for factors that affect promised benetits of single- 
employer plans only or of multi-employer plans only. Theory about what these factors may be is 
presently lacking. 
“Results are available from the author. 
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Table 2 
Percentage changes in promised pension benelits: Single-employer 
versus multi-employer plans.* 
Single-employer Multi-employer 
Abs. (rel.) freq. Abs. (rel.) freq. 
Panel A: Frequency distribution 
Decreaseb 17 (22%) 17 (52%) 
No change’ 22 (29%) 4 (12%) 
Increased 37 (49%) 12 (34%) 
Total 76 ( 100%) 33 (100%) 
Single-employer Multi-employer 
Panel B: Sample statistics 
Mean 0.078 - 0.029 
Standard 
deviation 0.201 0.242 
Number of 
observations 76 33 
t-statistic for 
H,: mean = 0 3.38 -0.68 
^Source: The 1970 and 1976 Digest of Selected Pension Plans, 
published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
bDecrease indicates that the promised pension benefits decreased 
over the sample period. 
‘No change indicates that the promised pension benefits did not 
change over the sample period. 
dIncrease indicates that the promised pension benefits increased 
over the sample period. 
The final row of panel B reports the results of a one-sided t-test. The null 
hypothesis is that the percentage change in promised benefits is equal to 
zero. The alternative hypothesis is that the percentage change in promised 
benefits is greater than zero. The null hypothesis is rejected for single- 
employer plans, but not for mult-employer plans. Thus, a comparison of 
single employer plans with multi-employer plans provides substantial evi- 
dence that the plans covered by the PBGC insurance increased promised 
pension benefits relative to those plans that were not covered by the 
insurance. 
4.2.2. Funding status 
The moral hazard hypothesis also predicts that the increase in promised 
benefits would be greater the less well funded the plan. Measuring the 
funding status of the pension plans in the sample is problematic because 
corporations typically sponsor several different pension plans. For example, a 
manufacturing firm is likely to establish separate plans for salaried workers, 
G.R. Niehaus. PBGC’sflat fee schedule 65 
Table 3 
Percentage changes in promised pension benelits: Single employer 





Abs. (rel.) freq. 
Panel A: Frequency distribution 
Decrease 13 (30%) 
No change 4 (9%) 
Increase 27 (61%) 























“See table 2. 
clerical workers, assembly line workers, etc. Although data are available on 
the aggregate funding status of a firm’s pension plans, the funding status of 
individual pension plans is not publicly available. As a result, the relation- 
ship between funding status and promised benefit changes cannot be 
examined in detail.’ 
Some insight into the effect of funding status on promised benefit changes 
can be obtained, however, because the funding status of collectively bar- 
gained and non-collectively bargained plans differ, on average. Pre-ERISA 
funding levels for plans covering union workers were thirty percent lower 
than for non-union plans [see Ippolito (1985)]. Thus, among the single 
employer plans, collectively bargained plans are expected to show a greater 
increase in promised benefits than non-collectively bargained plans. 
Table 3 provides a comparison of collectively bargained and non- 
collectively bargained plans. Panel A reports that the percentage of firms that 
increased promised benefits is significantly greater for collectively bargained 
plans than for non-collectively bargained plans. In particular, a non- 
parametric chi-square test rejects that the two groups are drawn from a 
homogeneous distribution. 
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The evidence in panel B of table 3, however, is less supportive of the 
hypothesis. Although the mean percentage change for collectively bargained 
plans is greater than for non-collectively bargained plans, the difference in 
means is not significant at conventional levels. 
5. Discussion of results 
The results of the previous section indicate that promised pension benefits 
increased in single-employer plans following ERISA. This evidence is consis- 
tent with the hypothesis that the PBGC’s tlat fee schedule causes a moral 
hazard problem with respect to promised pension benefits. 
The results are also consistent with two other hypotheses about the 
PBGC. The first hypothesis is that the PBGC reduced the costs of 
negotiating and enforcing pension contracts. According to this argument, 
severe contracting problems existed prior to the formation of the PBGC, and 
the PBGC signilicantly reduced these problems. Ippolito (1988) thoroughly 
examines the validity of this alternative explanation. He finds no evidence 
that severe contracting problems existed prior to ERISA or that the 
contracting environment changed following ERISA. 
The second alternative hypothesis is that the PBGC insurance causes a 
more efficient sharing of pension risk. According to this argument, the 
introduction of insurance shifts risk away from employees and employers to 
the more efficient risk bearer, the PBGC. As a consequence, the risky activity 
(i.e., pension compensation) is encouraged. Note that according to this 
argument, promised benefits would have increased even if the insurance were 
fairly priced. 
It is difficult to distinguish the moral hazard hypothesis from the risk 
sharing hypothesis using the data presented here. Both hypotheses predict 
that promised benefits would increase in plans covered by the insurance, and 
both predict that the increase would be higher in riskier plans (i.e., more 
under-funded plans). Thus the increase in promised benefits documented 
earlier may be partially attributed to risk shifting. 
A question naturally arises about the risk sharing argument: If fairly priced 
insurance would increase pension compensation, then why did employers and 
employees not purchase insurance in the private market? One possibility is 
that a market failure occurred for pension insurance, perhaps because of the 
systematic risk associated with pensions [see Campbell and Glenn (1985)]. 
However, private insurance is available for pensions. A second possible 
answer to why private insurance was not purchased is that risky pensions 
were the efficient form of compensation.~9 In this case, the PBGC insurance 
interferes with efficient contracting between employees and employers, 
‘9fppolito (1985) argues that risky pensions act as a bond to prevent unions from ‘holding up’ 
the firm and extracting rents. 
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6. Summary 
This paper derives the hypothesis that promised pension compensation 
increased following ERISA in plans that were covered by the PBGC 
insurance program. This hypothesis is based on the argument that the 
PBGC’s flat fee schedule causes a moral hazard problem with respect to 
promised pension compensation. 
The empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that moral hazard induced 
firms to increase promised pension compensation after the introduction of 
the PBGC insurance. Plans that were affected by the PBGC insurance show 
a significant increase in promised benefits relative to plans that were not 
covered by the insurance. Of the plans covered by the insurance, those that 
were the result of collective bargaining show a greater increase (although not 
statistically significant) in promised benefits than non-collectively bargained 
plans. Since, on average, collectively bargained plans are less well funded 
than non-collectively bargained plans, the latter evidence lends additional 
support to the moral hazard hypothesis. 
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